Let’s get started. Thank you for having us. I’m Jakub Janda, Director of European Values Center for Security Policy based in Prague, Czech Republic, and this is my spouse Adriana. She runs Communications and People in Need, which is one of the largest NGOs in Central Eastern Europe.

It’s a biggest one and I’m digital strategist. It’s such an honor to meet you. Thank you for having us.

It’s a pleasure.

I maybe would just briefly introduce what we do…

Of course.

…and then maybe discuss a bit what I think might interest to you as well. Our team is in Prague since 2005. We focus mainly on security policy affairs related to Russia and in recent years of China.

Most of our focus, we have team of 28 people, focuses on Russian disinformation in Central and Eastern Europe. Given the rise of China and Chinese interests activities in our region, we have found a lot of good partners here in Taiwan. Our official partners are the INDSR, the Defense Ministry think tank.

We are looking around how we could be helpful. That’s why thanks to your Foreign Ministry, we are here, both of us, so that we could spend a couple of months here in Taipei, learn about what other organizations are doing here, and, basically, plan our future activities, in cooperation between Czech, hopefully other Central European countries, like Lithuania, and Taiwanese entities.

That’s where I see a lot of potential. First, because of the shared values, but, second, of the shared threat as well. I would say, until now, there has been very little cooperation on practical level, because Taiwan has mainly focused on Western Europe. Now, because of our ongoing diplomatic efforts, between, not only Lithuania starting it, but I will create…

That’s a great phrase that I’m going to be using.

Yes.

I hope so. Now, in recent two or three years, we have a lot of political or diplomatic openings, between various political leaders from Central Europe, Lithuania being the bravest one to start it, but we hope that Czech Republic will be the second now. We finally have a good government to believe our…practically in after a lot of years.

Since our organization actually focuses on these affairs of national security and things related to digital disinformation, we are searching for what partnership we could make, so that, let’s say, the political relationship, which will be growing this year and the coming years, which is only…we could translate it into more practical things.

That’s what actually matters at the end. Not only the political one, but let’s say, the more practical ones, which have political impact.

In practical terms, we are opening our office here as EVC, hopefully, in a couple of weeks. We are finishing up our registration of with your Ministry of Interior, and we will have some future, let’s say, a permanent stand here in Taipei to actually have more direct cooperation.

Two areas, I was just finish up mentioning. One, we want to actually serve as a hub for Central European experts on disinformation, which could come to Taipei, to share their knowledge from Central Eastern Europe, mainly on Russian disinformation and public communications or government communications to it with their Taiwanese counterparts, government and non governmental ones.

Most of the cooperation which exists is, I would say, very short term. Usually, it’s conferences, delegations, but it’s short term.

I’ve been to hundreds of panels.

Yes, exactly.

Last two years.

Yes, exactly. We all like them to some extent, but I think we all hate them at some extent, right?

Well, that’s my job. [laughs]

Yes, I know. It’s job of all of us, so we know how it works, but we need more long term cooperation.

That’s right.

You can build trust between people from different parts of the world, when they meet each other in person for longer time than just one conference.

That’s the visiting fellowship program we plan for three or four months, every time to, let’s say, rotate expert on disinformation from governments and NGOs, here in Taipei. Also, give similar visiting fellowship programs to visit Prague or Vilnius, for Taiwanese experts. So far, nothing like this exists, and it’s right time to start it. That’s one area.

Second area, to finish up, is practical, let’s say, direct sharing of specific knowledge, which is some of it is specifically oriented to China as a, I would say, hostile actor. Some of it is on the experience, which you have with various levels of your defense, disinformation defense mainly. What is inspirational to us, is to see how you do it on the government level.

Because in Central Europe, many governments are relatively slow and bureaucratic in responding to disinformation, but there are many good people in the governments trying to change it.

It’s mostly about the tempo, right?

Yes.

Traditionally, bureaucracy works on a quarterly tempo.

Yes, so that’s where we are. I will stop here. This is basically where we are, what we are planning to do. I’m happy to discuss more of it, but I don’t want to speak that long.

Sure. I’m here for you.

Yes.

I’m here like a communication advisor of the EC, but, me personally, I work for people in need which is the biggest NGO in Central and Eastern Europe. I think we are a very strong in media literacy.

We have very big programs providing the media, I say, to schools like elementary and high schools. Maybe that’ll be interesting for you because I think we are leader in maybe whole Europe, so maybe there are some experience to share as well.

The curriculum in those countries, you look at them and you provide supplemental material, or how does it work?

Yes. We are teaching the teachers how to teach the media literacy because our Minister of Education is not providing very well educational materials, only from the topic.

Still, the media literacy is what’s important. That’s our priority, but the Ministry of Education is little bit too slow to follow the contents, so we are developing the educational materials for the schools and for the teachers.

OK, so there’s also a direct education program that One World in schools that also…

Yes. You already know that.

Excellent. You’re still working there while serving as an advisor to the center?

Yes.

A couple of clarifying questions. When you’re saying that you’re sending or sponsoring fellowship both ways, did you already have the names in mind in either direction?

Not yet. We are starting because in practical terms, we both arrived in October, and after almost a month in quarantine here, we basically started slowly in November.

Now, I hope that our programming could start in March or April. We are now discussing with your Foreign Ministry how much of that would they like to support.

Also talking to other partners and couple of foundations, which are usual partners for us, and what we are pitching there with is this fellowship program because that is missing.

That’s easy to do, and our center in Prague does this for Eastern European colleagues. We have these anchors who work or NGO experts who work in Georgia, Ukraine, or in Belarus, for example, and we bring them to Prague to learn about how some of the other NGOs work on disinformation, and then they come back home to their home countries.

This regular tool which we use and we see that it’s actually working because if you spend a couple of months in one country, you talk to the experts. You build further relationships as an NGO expert or as a governmental to mid level expert in the government because that’s something what is not usually being done in Central European governments.

I see this as a big opportunity in the future as well because it’s much easier to do it on, let’s say, let’s call it disinformation area.

For many things where we work regularly in, meaning defense and security, some of European governments are still having obstacles because of their own interpretation of One China policy, which for them means very limited security defense engagement with Taiwan, which I hope to change, but it’s not easy. Disinformation is much easier to do.

It’s not specifically. [laughs]

Exactly, because you could say it’s not defense, right? It’s much easier to do these things as…

…education.

Or education. Yes. That’s the tactics.

I think it’s a good time to start moving, let’s say, from doing only the conferences, which we do as well. You attend many of them and it’s important politically, but let’s say more on the sharing level between government experts or NGO experts. I think it’s very good to start doing it in this practical manner. That’s our hope.

Because you’re framing it in a mini lateral way, right? It’s not just about the couple bilateral fellows.

I hope for it, yes.

Rather, it’s about regionally building a community of practice, for lack of a better term, on disinformation defense education.

Or resilience, you could say, that’s easier.

Or resilience. That’s based on what’s already working for you. How many years have you been running that out of your…

Well, we worked on disinformation since 2015, but mainly on Russian disinformation, and what I think one of the reasons why your Foreign Ministry wants us to be here and we are proud of it, is that we actually have quite a good community of disinformation experts in Central Eastern Europe.

Most of them focus on Russia and that’s their main experience, but that community is already close to us. We have closed door meetings with them every year, couple of various things which you do in your region, we do in Central Europe.

We have this community, basically ready in hand if I put it that way, and many of them are good…I would say fans of Taiwan at this moment. They don’t have direct engagement yet.

That’s why it’s relatively easy to start bringing them into this possible visiting fellowship program where they would be interested, they have a lot of good experience with Russian disinformation in Central Europe. I think that kind of experience could be very well shared.

The interest is clear there. We are getting so many calls when we out here in Taipei over from Central European governments and think things over, “How can they engage? What can we do together?” I’m telling them, “Look, wait a bit. We need to put it together, get funding to it so that we could slowly start bringing people here because to go beyond one of conferences.”

It could go for a couple of months for every individual. I hope that we could be bringing two or three individuals at one time, that’s my hope. It’s like a small group which we could bringing and as you mentioned from multiple countries.

Because I am glad that our country, Czech Republic, is moving forward on Taiwan relations as this Lithuania. Our best hope is to use this practical tool, let’s say, for foreign policy reasons.

Because for many of our governments in Central Europe, they need to sell back home why engaging with Taiwan make sense? Not only on value based focus, but also on very pragmatic issues. Those governments need to be able to tell their own members of parliament or audiences, we are engaging with Taiwan, and we have very practical things…

Because it is a gold mine, right?

Yes, exactly it is.

It was literally described as such.

Our hope is that we could actually start this global effect. Where we could actually have more governments going into this very practical cooperation where they could, for example, send their government experts to be here for a couple of months to learn from you and then, in a way, some of the Taiwanese experts study their own countries.

That could be also used as a tool for foreign policy outreach of Taiwan. Because our hope is that, that’s something where we could solidify the already existing opening doors, let’s say.

I’ve met some teams doing this sort of arrangement, but they almost always focus on national election or referendum. They would arrive maybe half a year before a national referendum or election and so that they can do the good data gathering with the unfilled team with the back up with the team from abroad.

What you’re saying is that even in non election times like even for the next six months, for example, where there’s no election. First field personal election relationship and then we focus on specific research project, so not a research project based, but rather just fellows.

Yes. I think the case studies, for example, how you respond to some disinformation. I mean of China or on COVID and obviously related to China or only domestic that’s very interesting. Because for example, in the COVID situation or the pandemic, many…I would say most of European governments are very bad at communicating within the pandemic about…

5G and masks.

Yes it is. Not only China related issues. All of that. It seems to me that you are doing quite a good job in doing it and Central European governments are not. I mean if I speak about government’s, I don’t mean only ministers. Those are the ones who are going to say, “Yes. It’s a good idea to cooperate.”

We actually the main cooperative bodies I think, are the specific teams you mentioned. Usually department heads at various ministries who are quite often connected to things like leaders like ourselves who work on that. Those are the communities of practitioners, let’s say.

Who will be invited to Prague every year, we know them quite well and we need to plug them into this Taiwan cooperation because they haven’t studied it yet.

It would be a, for example, two or three individuals coming to Taiwan on a better topic maybe infodemic management or whatever. Then without doing anything specific for the short term, just focus on building personal relationships with the people doing it.

Yes, they could do…I mean, our plan is that they would be do like a short comparative report of what their own governments does in communicating on COVID for example, what Taiwanese government and its institutions have been doing on COVID, so just brief comparisons.

That’s not the main thing, it’s not an academic research. It needs to be very practical so that when they get home, they actually have a lot of things which they would share back home with their own teams.

The other direction would be like people and STR or IORG or double thing or whatever going to your country and then learning about everything about Russians.

Yes, basically. I think so because there’s a lot of experience actually in Central Europe which let’s say, includes like Ukraine, the Baltic countries, there is so much of that knowledge and experience. Also the media literacy programs are well expanded in some countries.

I would say that often they are run by NGOs, not really by governments. That’s the case because many governments in countries even like Ukraine or the Baltic countries, are not very good at doing it. That’s where the activities and then her team’s activities actually are very interesting to us to compare. Do you have a lot of media literacy programs as well?

Definitely.

Basically like comparing it where there are things to learn. I think we already have a good idea and now in the coming months time to start matching it up, so people can actually pretty directly use this fellowship. That’s the easiest thing to do because everybody has to do it online.

If I very bluntly, if you are a Central European government official and yes, you are interested in Taiwan, but if you don’t have to travel here, if you are just sitting back home doing it from your couch, it’s interesting, but I don’t think everybody would pay a full attention because there are so many other…

Yeah, just like 20 others windows. [laughs]

Exactly, so you need to move the people here or let’s say, the Taiwanese people to send to you…

Let’s try the VR.

Yes, once possible, happy to do it. It would be easier to skip the quarantine.

OK. All right. It’s a good idea. The terms infodemic management, it would work well for the Taiwanese researchers to get behind this program and to say, as I mentioned, not just politically, it has a real shared urgency because everybody understand that in a transition to word of Greek letters, new variants of the virus, each time miscommunication can cost a lot to a country if the communication need to be U turned or reversed or dispelled or dissipated.

This is therefore urgent and also there’s a lot of expertise in Taiwan, so that we manage to not be perfect but be very quick and resilient in light of new scientific findings and new configurations of society in the future.

That’s a good export, so to speak on Taiwan. As for the importing of knowledge, I think the Russian angle it has a subtle distinction because if we’re specializing on election interference, then that becomes comparable. All the liberal democratic countries suffered, probably, from the same election interference tactics… We don’t do electronic voting for national elections though, so one less attack surface.

Otherwise, the same. If it’s not tied to elections, it’s rare for people to spend an extended amount of time because the assumption is that the tactics will probably change by the time that they actually deployed to the next election. Advanced research or advanced deployment does not quite work, because it is a double hermeneutics, right?

If they detect that one counter offense is working well or the media competence program has already inoculated people against one particular form of disinformation vector, then they would not double down on that vector. They would simply invent a new vector. The main message would need to be research capacity and development capacity.

The Taiwanese expert do not have to come up with the tools themselves. Rather, if the tools prove valuable to the Central European countries, then people would pool together their developmental resources on the common tool. It will be like a shared public infrastructure, like vaccines. Actually, unlike vaccines — like masks.

…that are truly shared between people and new mask designs and so on. They’re not really patentable anyway, so people just benefit from the common understanding of these things. Vaccines, too, but mostly AstraZeneca.

If I may add, this is the reason why we started our first annual gatherings. It’s called Stratcom Summit, like Strategic Communication Summit in Prague, since 2015, because we saw so many Russian disinformation attacks on European democracies.

We saw the need to create basic, like a closed door safe space for government officials or government experts, to talk to each other over how does Russia do it in individual countries. They all felt they are unique in the way, how they are targeted by the adversary, but in many ways, it was comparable.

What we started to do in Prague, and I would like to extend it here, but the connection is basically closed door discussions between those experts.

When they feel they are in a, let’s say, a trusted space between partners, they can actually, and they quite often do share their case studies. Meaning, that they can share, “Look in our elections last year, this is what happened. This is what we did. This is what we did not do, because we don’t have the political support, for example, and this is how it ended up.”

That’s the learning, which is practical, because some of the research is very quantitative. You have to look at the data, but in many ways, it’s good to talk to people who are in charge of responding.

Meaning, usually specific ministry officials at mid level, who are not politically motivated or affiliated, but who are government experts, who can say, “Look, this is where we screwed up, and this is what we should have done better, and this is what I think you could learn from us, next time.”

This is what you cannot do at conferences, because people are not going to say this on a panel. They will say it, if they are here for a couple of months, talking to each other. They can share lessons learned in practical sharing sessions, let’s say, but usually, this does not work in public or open panels, to my experience.

This is actually what, most of the time, the government officials we talk to in the Central Europe, this is what they appreciate the most. They can read the papers and read reports, but when they want to share, let’s say, government official to government official, they need to do it directly and privately. That’s what we can easily start now, because there’s already a political opening to it.

I would use one more foreign policy term, which could be useful. I call it “the jealousy tactics.” What we need to do is that countries which are opening to Taiwan, like Czech Republic and Lithuania, need to be seen by other Europeans. That they are getting something more incorporation with Taiwan and others…

Yeah. Getting a clear advantage.

Exactly. It actually motivates the others to start engaging Taiwan, exactly. That’s what happening now in Estonia, where their political and expert establishment is very much feeling jealous of Lithuania, which is having all of this cooperation with Taiwan and Estonia is not yet.

It motivates them to start doing it. When they have those practical things of sharing, this is what they can then tell the other Europeans and say, “Look, we are having this with Taiwanese experts. Maybe you should consider it too. We have a place if you want to join.” The foreign policy angle is important there. It helps your diplomatic efforts.

We need to have a slope of topics by beginning with public media and education and ends with, “I don’t have a fax” or something.

Yes.

Right? Then, as you progress on this, you get more tangible benefits on the practical level.

That’s my hope, because that’s where I see, let’s say, the practical interest in Europe who want to get that knowledge from Taiwan. The other way around, we want to use this tool for showing publicly that engaging Taiwan actually makes practical sense for Europeans.

There’s a way how to start a snowball effect across Central European governments, so that they feel like they are getting something very practical with cooperation in Taiwan. Also, it’s not only a PR exercise, is something very practical. That’s what I think actually.

It always begins with a PR exercise. [laughs]

I know, it does. It’s important.

It’s important so people know about it.

To keep it sustainable, we need to have these practical things like that.

I see that.

May I ask, do you have some let’s say projects or activities like this ones of sharing practical knowledge on communications with some other governments or…

The mobile framework for doing that, and correct me if I’m wrong, is the GCTF.

GCTF.

GCTF with recently other countries willingness to join as co host, were now acquired. Not that quite, but just quite. [laughs] . Many other countries are expressing interest in forming study circles, because GCTF fundamentally is about doing something.

Yes, it does.

That you just mentioned. Before the pandemic, there’s a lot of social gatherings, so it’s not just panels, but mostly workshops and social gatherings afterwards. We’re, of course, seeing MoFA being very resilient in adopting the form.

The hope is that, that you see here participating countries can actually establish mutual relationships of sending fellows around exactly as I mentioned post pandemic or at least postponed pandemic. That’s the framework I’m aware of.

Have you been in touch with the community?

Yes, and I’ve been talking at a GCTF and TFD did it two months ago. I was one of the speakers as well.

But it’s not, it’s over videos. [laughs]

I know. That’s why, it’s hard to distinguish from everything else for some of the participants. The physical part, that’s what I’m trying to press on the physical part, meaning, the visiting fellowship in the future.

Because even with the quarantine, if a person is here for three or four months and I see it on ourselves when we are here for four months ourselves, we could get a lot of experience, knowledge, direct contact with people, much better than if you are here only for two weeks or…

I was at a 2018 GCTF Defending Democracy through Media Literacy. Also TFD, of course. It’s very physical. It’s mostly about social gathering.

I hope that some of the topics that you expressed can actually be…I wouldn’t say, it’s just part of GCTF, but we need to think about that angle from the GCTF planning as well, instead of saying that video conference works OK. [laughs]

We need to see one of tool kits, but still have even with the quarantining at least three months or six months of relationships. That’s a point well taken.

The GCTF is very good actually, how it’s structured with the US and Japan, it does make sense, because it allows European governments to jump into it much easier than if they did it only bilaterally. It’s a good format to be used, I’d say, foreign policy wise.

Australia is also in, I believe.

That makes sense. It was good. May I ask, how are you? You’ve been engaging also with the Lithuanians. Forward with some of the invitations, they wanted to have you speak at some of their events as well. I assume you are not traveling that much, because it’s…

That’s why I’m getting the booster, so that I can travel.

I got a booster in Medigen, that’s also something to work with.

Anyway, I’m OK to travel, even with my previous vaccine passport of just two AstraZeneca shots. I’m good to travel till…The SWISS app tells me I’m good to travel till June next year. For the first half of next year, I’m covered.

I already agreed to some MEPS inviting me to Brussels. I don’t know whether that would be June, or before, or after, but it’s very likely that I would travel.

Very good, because for example, if you would be in Brussels during your trip, it would be worthwhile to actually possibly extending your trip for about two days. If you would be already in Europe, it’s quite close to get by, for example, to host you in Prague.

As you mentioned the knowledge from Taiwan, which is a great export, you personally, your story, and the way how you do it in Taiwan is a great export for Taiwan as well. Your physical presence if it would make sense in the future during any of your trips to Europe, it would be a perfectly good fit.

It’s just a couple hours flight.

Yes, it is.

Theoretically, I can be there the same day.

Yes. From Brussels to Prague is two hours by flight. It’s always very easy. If you’re already in Europe and you are vaccinated, it is easy to travel. I think and I hope it will stay that way. That should be easy for you to use that part as well.

Yeah. I told them maybe I’ll just stay in Europe until they relax the quarantine rules.

I’ll be back in Taiwan.

Go on a government strike. OK, wow.

I still work overseas, always as the minister since day one. If I say “No, that’s the ECC’s business.” I hope I didn’t set the quarantine rules.

An extended stay is something that we’re seriously considering. The meeting will be planned. We’ll take that into consideration.

OK, I’ll be in touch and we’ll see how we could be of good use of it and well.

Yeah, because if there’s a first batch of fellows coming from Taiwan to Europe, my itinerary overlapping with them that would be seen as…

That will be perfect.

…yeah.

That will be perfect to budget.

I can provide this kind of contextual introduction to their peers. What their role are between the Taiwanese social sector, which does most of the job, the government, the private sector, and so on without interfering with their work or the ranking of their work. I think that’s the best.

Mm hmm, it makes perfect sense.

OK, cool.

May I also ask if you could give us an advice who are here. I’d say the best partners to engage with. You mentioned most of them you already worked with the FDI, DSR, the Doublethink Lab, the usual ones, but is there somebody else you think is working…

Have you been working with Minister Wu Ming hsuan’s office?

Not yet.

Minister Wu is the architect of the counter disinformation while I’m just the technological psychic.

Basically, a lot of it boils down to the sheer urgency. The sheer sense of urgency and infodemic management because I think I’m on the front line of that. I can speak with some confidence. For example, foreign interference in non infodemic, non pandemic related. Minister Wu knows a lot more about that than I do. Wu’s office is I think a natural ally of yours.

Thank you. I’m asking is that when we talk and plan those visiting policies for, let’s say government experts from some European countries, we’ll basically be putting together a plan for them. Where can they learn what? With some of the things, it is quite clear with you. It’s very clear what it is.

I’m just seeing what else, which other places on the map are there, so people can learn from virtually.

I see that. It depends on their interest, right? In Taiwan, Minister Wu also works with this broad range of people who do specific research on the kind of tools and tool kits, specific vectors, which I am less familiar with. It depends on the kind of disinformation or kind of misinformation that there may be or whether you’re focusing.

For example, instant messaging or whether you’re focusing on specific large platforms, such as Facebook, and so on, or whether may have safe spaces for things like that. There are specific research teams exploring those topics. Minister Wu know far better than I do. Although, of course, if you have a specific team already with names in their previous portfolios, I can also look it up for you.

No, thank you. Just to ask the final question on this. If I understand it well, you are basically the policy pusher. You are the one who is trying to change the way how the government operates on specific issues from your position. While the other minister is actually in charge of more the operational responses, right, the way of how doing it right.

We have nine Ministers at Large, if you’re referring to that. The spokesperson, Minister Wu is also a Minister at Large. We have 32 ministers that has commissioners, that has a ministry. That’s correct.

Yes. For European context, usually we would have a Minister of Interior who is in charge of basically disinformation in some areas. Then we have Foreign Ministry, which looks at foreign policy disinformation. Sometimes, Defense Ministry, but it’s really military oriented usually.

Sometimes in Europe, it is not really clear who should be the main responding body. In some of the European governments including the Czech Republic or others, our electoral systems actually mean that we have coalition governments. It’s not one party like in the UK around the whole government.

With government, there are problems.

Yes, I know. The thing is that it’s a problem of mandate quite often. Not a legal mandate, but in a way of who is responding how? That’s a painful issues quite often politically as well. The experts know how it should work, but the political reality doesn’t really correspond to it.

Yeah. In Taiwan, we have this system of at-large Ministers. When the original disinformation planning was done, it’s very clear. It’s Minister Lo as the Legal Minister at Large orchestrates this response and then the implementation is a spokesperson. At that time, Kolas Yotaka. Then later on, Kolas Yotaka moved on to be spokesperson for the presidential office. Now, Minister Lo is also spokesperson for the cabinet, so it’s basically his left and right brain coordinating this.

I see. OK, thank you. That’s interesting. This is exactly kind of questions, which our European partners would have, which is they are interested in the practical structures on how they could actually make good sense of it. There are practical things they could learn and bring back to Taiwan.

Yeah. When the disinformation plan, come here, disinformation plan originally formed will have the spokesperson. Me, as a technological evaluator and Minister Lo chairing that conversation.

For the technological underpinnings, I basically give my assessments what to do with those tool kits and so on. Most importantly, which part is left best for the courts to do. Which part is best left for the NGOs to do, so that administration doesn’t overstep our boundaries.

Thank you. OK.

Anything else, I can? OK, cool.

Perfect. If anyway we could be helpful happy to be helpful.

Yes, sure.

This is a good advice for us.

We’re just one email away.

Yes. Maybe I’ll ask if I can connect also on Signal, so I don’t email these things. Some of those are more sensitive in the future as well, so I will communicate through there.

Thank you very much for that. We will be communicating here with MoFA to see how we plan the activities starting, hopefully, in March, all these fellowships. I would like to be also connected to see if once you travel to Europe, we could hopefully make a good sense of your presence in Europe.

Get you to Prague for one or two days. You would see a lot of Prague and a lot of good people there, who are all good friends of you and your work. That could be a good foreign policy push as well. Finally, with confidence can say we have a good government on Taiwan related issues, which we did not have the last seven years in Prague, but now we do after the elections.

For example, you might remember this Czech senate speaker who was here, two years ago, in September 2020, his party just won the elections and have the prime minister . So basically their are policy in many aspects will be close to it and you likely would know the mayor of Prague who’s a…

…celebrity in Taiwan.

Well known here yes, and his party actually now has the foreign minister in four dimension post, so they are on the right side finally, and they want to do things with Taiwan but quite often they don’t know how exactly so that’s our role, how to be, informally helpful to thing, plan out things, which could be done.

Sometimes on NGO level and some, hopefully, in the future all government to government level because those things don’t start easily as, you know, because of the diplomatic sensitivities, but we have the brave friends who already started many things.

So we could be on their back and trying to make it a snowball effect across Central Europe, so it’s not only one country doing it, which can be pressured, but if there is more of it, that’s our hope.

Excellent.

Yes, yes, thank you.

Thank you.

Thanks so much.