That is a great question. For example, Taiwan’s main judiciary innovation when it comes to direct democracy is the “good only for two years” referendum. If you pass a referendum, a national one, it is binding, but is binding only for half the term of the current legislature. It means that it is like a limited time simulation because for marriage equality, it is not easy to simulate in a more local way because people move all the time and there are also about cross-jurisdictional marriages and so on, but people can talk to themselves and say, “Let us try this social innovation of marring individuals and not families for two years, and if it does not work, well, let us go back to the drawing board because the two referenda that binds it are only good for two years anyway.” This is, as I mentioned, very different from the traditional, sortition-based, constitution-making citizens’ assembly which is good if not forever, at least for a decade or so. But we say very simply, “Two years,” and I think that is the time-based innovation. We are not changing the fundamental theories about referenda or about juries or about citizens’ assembly, but we are just saying, “Let us do it on a shorter, iterative time cycle.”

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