What we started to do in Prague, and I would like to extend it here, but the connection is basically closed door discussions between those experts.

We saw the need to create basic, like a closed door safe space for government officials or government experts, to talk to each other over how does Russia do it in individual countries. They all felt they are unique in the way, how they are targeted by the adversary, but ...

If I may add, this is the reason why we started our first annual gatherings. It’s called Stratcom Summit, like Strategic Communication Summit in Prague, since 2015, because we saw so many Russian disinformation attacks on European democracies.

Yes, once possible, happy to do it. It would be easier to skip the quarantine.

Exactly, so you need to move the people here or let’s say, the Taiwanese people to send to you…

If I very bluntly, if you are a Central European government official and yes, you are interested in Taiwan, but if you don’t have to travel here, if you are just sitting back home doing it from your couch, it’s interesting, but I don’t think everybody would pay a full ...

Basically like comparing it where there are things to learn. I think we already have a good idea and now in the coming months time to start matching it up, so people can actually pretty directly use this fellowship. That’s the easiest thing to do because everybody has to do ...

I would say that often they are run by NGOs, not really by governments. That’s the case because many governments in countries even like Ukraine or the Baltic countries, are not very good at doing it. That’s where the activities and then her team’s activities actually are very interesting to ...

Yes, basically. I think so because there’s a lot of experience actually in Central Europe which let’s say, includes like Ukraine, the Baltic countries, there is so much of that knowledge and experience. Also the media literacy programs are well expanded in some countries.

That’s not the main thing, it’s not an academic research. It needs to be very practical so that when they get home, they actually have a lot of things which they would share back home with their own teams.

Yes, they could do…I mean, our plan is that they would be do like a short comparative report of what their own governments does in communicating on COVID for example, what Taiwanese government and its institutions have been doing on COVID, so just brief comparisons.

Who will be invited to Prague every year, we know them quite well and we need to plug them into this Taiwan cooperation because they haven’t studied it yet.

We actually the main cooperative bodies I think, are the specific teams you mentioned. Usually department heads at various ministries who are quite often connected to things like leaders like ourselves who work on that. Those are the communities of practitioners, let’s say.

Yes it is. Not only China related issues. All of that. It seems to me that you are doing quite a good job in doing it and Central European governments are not. I mean if I speak about government’s, I don’t mean only ministers. Those are the ones who are ...

Yes. I think the case studies, for example, how you respond to some disinformation. I mean of China or on COVID and obviously related to China or only domestic that’s very interesting. Because for example, in the COVID situation or the pandemic, many…I would say most of European governments are ...

That could be also used as a tool for foreign policy outreach of Taiwan. Because our hope is that, that’s something where we could solidify the already existing opening doors, let’s say.

Our hope is that we could actually start this global effect. Where we could actually have more governments going into this very practical cooperation where they could, for example, send their government experts to be here for a couple of months to learn from you and then, in a way, ...

Yes, exactly it is.

Because for many of our governments in Central Europe, they need to sell back home why engaging with Taiwan make sense? Not only on value based focus, but also on very pragmatic issues. Those governments need to be able to tell their own members of parliament or audiences, we are ...

Because I am glad that our country, Czech Republic, is moving forward on Taiwan relations as this Lithuania. Our best hope is to use this practical tool, let’s say, for foreign policy reasons.

It could go for a couple of months for every individual. I hope that we could be bringing two or three individuals at one time, that’s my hope. It’s like a small group which we could bringing and as you mentioned from multiple countries.

The interest is clear there. We are getting so many calls when we out here in Taipei over from Central European governments and think things over, “How can they engage? What can we do together?” I’m telling them, “Look, wait a bit. We need to put it together, get funding ...

That’s why it’s relatively easy to start bringing them into this possible visiting fellowship program where they would be interested, they have a lot of good experience with Russian disinformation in Central Europe. I think that kind of experience could be very well shared.

We have this community, basically ready in hand if I put it that way, and many of them are good…I would say fans of Taiwan at this moment. They don’t have direct engagement yet.

Most of them focus on Russia and that’s their main experience, but that community is already close to us. We have closed door meetings with them every year, couple of various things which you do in your region, we do in Central Europe.

Well, we worked on disinformation since 2015, but mainly on Russian disinformation, and what I think one of the reasons why your Foreign Ministry wants us to be here and we are proud of it, is that we actually have quite a good community of disinformation experts in Central Eastern ...

Or resilience, you could say, that’s easier.

I hope for it, yes.

I think it’s a good time to start moving, let’s say, from doing only the conferences, which we do as well. You attend many of them and it’s important politically, but let’s say more on the sharing level between government experts or NGO experts. I think it’s very good to ...

Or education. Yes. That’s the tactics.

Exactly, because you could say it’s not defense, right? It’s much easier to do these things as…

For many things where we work regularly in, meaning defense and security, some of European governments are still having obstacles because of their own interpretation of One China policy, which for them means very limited security defense engagement with Taiwan, which I hope to change, but it’s not easy. Disinformation ...

I see this as a big opportunity in the future as well because it’s much easier to do it on, let’s say, let’s call it disinformation area.

This regular tool which we use and we see that it’s actually working because if you spend a couple of months in one country, you talk to the experts. You build further relationships as an NGO expert or as a governmental to mid level expert in the government because that’s ...

That’s easy to do, and our center in Prague does this for Eastern European colleagues. We have these anchors who work or NGO experts who work in Georgia, Ukraine, or in Belarus, for example, and we bring them to Prague to learn about how some of the other NGOs work ...

Also talking to other partners and couple of foundations, which are usual partners for us, and what we are pitching there with is this fellowship program because that is missing.

Now, I hope that our programming could start in March or April. We are now discussing with your Foreign Ministry how much of that would they like to support.

Not yet. We are starting because in practical terms, we both arrived in October, and after almost a month in quarantine here, we basically started slowly in November.

Yes.

Yes, so that’s where we are. I will stop here. This is basically where we are, what we are planning to do. I’m happy to discuss more of it, but I don’t want to speak that long.

Yes.

Because in Central Europe, many governments are relatively slow and bureaucratic in responding to disinformation, but there are many good people in the governments trying to change it.

Second area, to finish up, is practical, let’s say, direct sharing of specific knowledge, which is some of it is specifically oriented to China as a, I would say, hostile actor. Some of it is on the experience, which you have with various levels of your defense, disinformation defense mainly. ...

That’s the visiting fellowship program we plan for three or four months, every time to, let’s say, rotate expert on disinformation from governments and NGOs, here in Taipei. Also, give similar visiting fellowship programs to visit Prague or Vilnius, for Taiwanese experts. So far, nothing like this exists, and it’s ...

You can build trust between people from different parts of the world, when they meet each other in person for longer time than just one conference.

Yes, I know. It’s job of all of us, so we know how it works, but we need more long term cooperation.

Yes, exactly. We all like them to some extent, but I think we all hate them at some extent, right?

Last two years.

Yes, exactly.

Most of the cooperation which exists is, I would say, very short term. Usually, it’s conferences, delegations, but it’s short term.