We do want constructive relations, but basically, we should not be in the business of throwing out the Taiwan Relations Act, or, in many other fields, giving China benefits without any return.

There’s also a dawning recognition, again, as we heard this morning, that China views itself as a competitor with the United States. Therefore, the United States has to see itself as a competitor with China.

A quick comment. Basically, what you’ve seen is, there are two factors at play here. Congress is well aware that you now have a solidified democracy in Taiwan that does all the great things that we heard about this morning. That is a really responsible player on the international scene, ...

Basically, they had to look at the act and realize that they can’t willy nilly cancel treaties, that they have to agree to the basic terms, that there are limits as to how much any administration can do and yet stay within the confines of the Taiwan Relations Act. It’s ...

I will quickly add that what we’re hearing from both sides of me is a back handed endorsement of the wisdom of the act itself, that basically, Congress set limits to what any administration could do vis à vis trying to "improve relations with China."

"We’re going to allow them to sanction US companies who continue to work on Taiwan, but want to do work on the mainland." It gave an underpinning for everything we wanted to do. It made an ability for an administration to unilaterally change practice with respect to Taiwan impossible.

This was not a resolution. It was not a sense of the Congress statement. It was US law, binding on future administrations, that would have to be changed by the Congress to say, "Well, we’re not going to conduct this sort of people to people relationship because the Chinese are ...

Folks within any administration that argued that "Well, this is a very important relationship for China. Therefore, we have to listen to the Chinese," would not have to explain how that was in conformity with the US strategic interests expressed by Congress, and, importantly, signed into law. That’s the difference ...

As I said before, we wouldn’t have the legal underpinning for pushing back.

Without that security safety net, the economic relationship, the people to people relationship would have become much more difficult pretty quickly in the sense that, as you’ve seen recently, the temptation would be on the part of the folks across the strait to try and increasingly restrict contacts between the ...

That’s a tough call, except I will go back to my original point, which is, it provided a security safety net.

It is ultimately the safety net under the relationship, which makes it clear to the mainland that we cannot stand by while a more aggressive policy is adopted towards Taiwan.

Frankly, from my reading, the Taiwan Relations Act rules that out. You would have to explain how you could get around the Taiwan Relations Act and agree to a much more coercive policy against Taiwan.

Whenever I hear people advocating for, "Well, Taiwan is so important to China. Therefore, we have to listen to the Chinese, listen to their concerns," those concerns are usually what we call the velvet glove over the iron hand. The implication is that we would stand by while the mainland ...

Inevitably, most of the talk you’ll hear implies that we, the United States, would be OK with a more coercive policy on the part of China, and that obviously would be breaking laws that exist.

Excellent question. Anybody who advocates for somehow swapping Taiwan for some sort of gain with China has to explain how that can be done within the context of the Taiwan Relations Act.

It was incredibly far sighted. The alternatives are very ugly to look at increasing coercion, perhaps no development of the democratic institutions here. I’m very thankful to a very, very wise Act of Congress signed by President Carter, that helped establish and continue the stability in the Taiwan Strait.

Frankly, the other side of the strait knows that we view stability in the strait, that we view the future of Taiwan as very important issues, and that the future of Taiwan can only be settled at some point to the satisfaction of the peoples on both side of the ...

It helped guide the tricornered relationship that C.J. Chen laid out so well, to a period of relative stability that has lasted for 40 years.

What the Taiwan Relations Act did was, it made it clear that it had to be US policy that that could not happen through the application of force, through coercion, the threat of force. That led to a different world. It led to a world where it helped the democratic ...

I think the predominant view, not the predominant, but a view held by many was that gradually, China and Taiwan would somehow become one, without stating any specific way that that would happen.

Just as importantly, that means that it gave the US a legal basis to consider Taiwan’s security an important interest to the United States of America. The Taiwan Relations Act put in wording with respect to security, that I don’t think the administration at that point had really expected, or ...

Very much awake. I want to start off by saying that everybody is always taught to be careful about hypotheticals, but this is such an important hypothetical that I’m going to grapple with it head on. Basically, what the Taiwan Relations Act did was, it gave a legal basis for ...

Everybody, wake up, please.